The FTC’s Magnuson-Moss Rulemaking Process – Still an Uphill ClimbWe’ve been hearing a lot lately about the FTC’s rulemaking procedures under Section 18 of the FTC Act (also known as “Mag-Moss” rulemaking). Long decried as too burdensome and difficult to use on a regular basis, this tool is now being celebrated for its enormous, untapped potential to establish industry-wide standards and enable the FTC to get monetary relief in its cases, post-AMG. (AMG didn’t affect the FTC authority to obtain monetary relief when it’s enforcing a rule.)

Is the old view or the new one correct? Is Mag-Moss rulemaking really so cumbersome, as many FTC staff and observers have long claimed? Have those burdens been overstated, warranting the enthusiasm we’re now seeing among FTC Commissioners, consumer groups, and Congress? Did the FTC’s changes to its internal rules last July (see below) really “streamline” the process as the FTC claimed?

As suggested by the title to this blogpost, I have an opinion: Mag-Moss is still an uphill climb. However, to enable readers to decide for themselves, I detail below the Mag-Moss process as laid out in the law. Although the FTC’s July changes stripped away some extra steps it had previously imposed under its rules, the hurdles in the law remain formidable.  Continue Reading The FTC’s Magnuson-Moss Rulemaking Process – Still an Uphill Climb

The FTC is focused on ensuring that consumers have options when it comes to repairing products. In 2019, they held a workshop to discuss manufacturer restrictions on repair rights. In a 2021 report, they concluded there was “scant evidence to support manufacturers’ justifications for repair restrictions.” After that, they issued a Policy Statement calling for more aggressive enforcement against manufacturers that impose these restrictions. Two weeks ago, we posted about settlements with Harley-Davidson and Westinghouse. Last week, the FTC announced a third settlement, this one involving Weber.

According to the FTC, Weber’s warranty included terms that conveyed that the warranty is void if customers use or install third-party parts on their grill products. For example, the warranty on certain Summit grills stated: “[t]he use and/or installation of parts on your WEBER products that are not genuine WEBER parts will void this warranty, and any damages that result hereby are not covered by this warranty.”

As we noted in our previous post, these types of restrictions violate the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, which broadly prohibits companies from conditioning a consumer product warranty on the consumer’s use of any article or service which is identified by brand name unless it is provided for free. Companies can, however, exclude warranty coverage for defects or damage caused by unauthorized parts or service.

As with the Harley-Davidson and Westinghouse settlements, Weber is prohibited from telling consumers that their warranties will be void if they use third-party parts, or that they should only use Weber-brand parts. Weber will be required to add specific language to its warranty saying, “Using third-party parts will not void this warranty.” If the company violates these terms, the FTC will be able to seek civil penalties of up to $46,517 per violation in federal court.

Companies that offer product warranties should take a close look at their warranty terms and related communications to ensure that they comply with the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act and developing federal and state laws specific to right to repair. We’re likely to see more of these actions on the federal and state levels.

The FTC is focused on ensuring that consumers have options when it comes to repairing products. In 2019, they held a workshop to discuss manufacturer restrictions on repair rights. In a 2021 report, they concluded there was “scant evidence to support manufacturers’ justifications for repair restrictions.” After that, they issued a Policy Statement calling for more aggressive enforcement against manufacturers that impose these restrictions. Last week, we may have seen the start of that enforcement.

According to the FTC, Harley-Davidson and Westinghouse both included illegal terms that voided warranties if customers used anyone other than the companies and their authorized dealers to get parts or repairs for their products. For example, a Harley warranty encouraged consumers to “insist that your authorized Harley-Davidson dealer uses only genuine Harley-Davidson replacement parts and accessories to keep your Harley-Davidson motorcycle and its limited warranty intact.”

These types of restrictions violate the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, which broadly prohibits companies from conditioning a consumer product warranty on the consumer’s use of any article or service which is identified by brand name unless it is provided for free. Companies can, however, exclude warranty coverage for defects or damage caused by unauthorized parts or service.

Under the terms of the settlements, the companies are prohibited from telling consumers that their warranties will be void if they use third-party services or parts, or that they should only use branded parts or authorized service providers. Moreover, the companies both agreed to affirmatively inform consumers of their rights. For example, warranties must disclose that “taking your product to be serviced by a repair shop that is not affiliated with or an authorized dealer of [Company] will not void this warranty. Also, using third-party parts will not void this warranty.”

While the FTC took action under existing law, federal and state legislatures continue efforts to pass legislation specific to right to repair. For example, earlier this month New York passed the first “right to repair” bill that requires all manufacturers of “digital electronic equipment” to make available to consumers and repair shops the information, tools, and spare parts needed to fix covered devices.

Companies that offer product warranties should take a close look at their warranty terms and related communications to ensure that they comply with the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act and developing federal and state laws specific to right to repair. We’re likely to see more of these actions on the federal and state levels.

Last week, we wrote about FTC Chair Khan’s memo describing her plans to transform the FTC’s approach to its work. This week, she followed up with a no-less-ambitious statement laying out her vision for data privacy and security, which she appended to an agency Report to Congress on Privacy and Security (“report”). Together, these documents outline a remarkably far-reaching plan to tackle today’s data privacy and security challenges. As noted in the dissents, however, some of the stated goals may exceed the bounds of the FTC’s current legal authority.

Continue Reading FTC Chair Khan’s Vision for Privacy – and Some Dissents

Since Lina Khan took the reins of the FTC, the agency has launched five new rulemakings under its Section 18 (“Mag-Moss”) authority – specifically, rules to combat government and business impersonation scams, deceptive earnings claims, “commercial surveillance,” deceptive endorsements, and “junk fees.” (I’m excluding here revisions to existing Mag-Moss rules, as well as rulemakings under other statutory authority.) While much has been written about how long Mag-Moss rulemakings generally take to complete (including by us, here), at least one of these rulemakings is proceeding apace – the first one, involving impersonation scams.

Indeed, the FTC issued its ANPR in December 2021, seeking comment for 60 days. Then, in October of 2022, it released its NPR proposing rule text and seeking comment for another 60 days (until December 16). At this point, it seems possible that the FTC could complete the process shortly after the comment period closes, just a little over a year after it started. That’s because one of the key steps under Mag-Moss – an informal public hearing – is only necessary if the FTC determines that it is, or if an interested party requests one. (See FTC Rules of Practice 1.11.) The FTC has said that no hearing is necessary and, so far, we’re unaware of any hearing requests from stakeholders.

Why is this rule moving so fast? Mainly because, for the most part, it’s a narrow, targeted rulemaking to ban practices that everyone agrees are fraudulent, and that have been the subject of many dozens of FTC cases. It’s also based solely on deception, which is far more straightforward than unfairness. For these reasons, even when the FTC was split 2-2 with the Commission sharply divided, both Republicans voted for this rule, paving the way for quick action and signaling to the public that there’s nothing controversial here.

Means and Instrumentalities

One key aspect of this rulemaking isn’t so simple, however, and requires more attention than it’s getting. Specifically, the proposed rule (which, in four short provisions, bans falsely posing as, or misrepresenting affiliation with, a government entity or business) tacks on a prohibition against providing the “means and instrumentalities” to engage in the banned practices. The NPR explains that means and instrumentalities (aka “M&I”) is a form of direct liability under Section 5 that’s distinct from secondary liability theories not allowed under Section 5. As the NPR states:

[T]he case law describes a form of direct liability for a party who, despite not having direct contact with the injured consumers, ‘passes on a false or misleading representation with knowledge or reason to expect that consumers may possibly be deceived as a result.’ In other words: ‘One who places in the hands of another a means of consummating a fraud or competing unfairly in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act is himself guilty of a violation of the Act.’ (citations omitted)

In fact, while the FTC doesn’t use the M&I theory every day, it has done so over the years (in both litigated cases and settlements) to challenge the “passing along” of deceptive promotional materials, badges, logos, or other items. Still, the precise contours of this legal theory remain somewhat murky. That murkiness raises special concerns where, as here, rule violations could lead to hefty civil penalties.

Strict Liability?     

The confusion here starts with the NPR, which sends mixed messages as to whether knowledge is an element of an M&I violation. The passage from the NPR cited above (referencing “knowledge or reason to expect” consumers may be deceived) suggests that knowledge is required. However, the proposed rule itself doesn’t mention knowledge. Does this mean, then, that a supplier or middleman could be strictly liable if he or she unwittingly passes along misleading claims to purchasers who then uses them to deceive consumers? Yes, it’s possible. Here are some points to consider:

First, knowledge isn’t an element of deception generally, and FTC precedent suggests that it isn’t an element of means and instrumentalities either, at least not technically. For example, the FTC’s recent complaints against ECM Biofilms, Office Depot, and Nerium all include M&I counts that don’t mention knowledge. The same is true in Shell Oil and C. Howard Hunt, two earlier cases that the FTC cites in its NPR.

On the other hand, the facts cited in M&I cases often (though not always) include evidence of knowledge, even if knowledge is absent from the complaint count. In Office Depot, for example, the complaint describes how (the entity charged with M&I) deliberately furnished Office Depot with a deceptive software program in order to mislead consumers into thinking they needed to buy computer repair services. See also Waltham Watch (court stressed that watch manufacturer knowingly furnished deceptive claims to distributors); Shell Oil (statement accompanying order said Shell knowingly passed along deceptive claims); and Nerium (complaint says Nerium encouraged its partners to make deceptive health claims).

In addition, a 2021 blogpost from former BCP Director Andrew Smith describes means and instrumentalities as “providing a false representation (or a forged or counterfeit item) to another with knowledge that it was possible that the means could be placed in the stream of commerce and passed on to consumers….”

Finally, there’s been debate over the years about the contours of means and instrumentalities, with some Commissioners saying that others are using it as a substitute for “aiding and abetting,” a form of secondary liability not within Section 5 (and that, incidentally, requires proof of knowledge). For example, in his dissent in Shell Oil, then-Commissioner Swindle said that because the claims Shell passed along to marketers were different from the claims ultimately made to consumers, Shell didn’t make its own deceptive claims through intermediaries as required for M&I liability, but at most engaged in aiding and abetting. (See also the partial dissent of then-Commissioner Ohlhausen in the FTC’s case against TRUSTe.)

While some of this gets fairly legalistic, their overarching points are that (1) it’s a big deal to hold someone liable for deceptive claims made by another, and there should be clear legal criteria for doing so; and (2) M&I means that a person or entity has disseminated their own claims through an intermediary.

Bottom Line  

The FTC’s bare bones rulemaking proposal doesn’t clear up any of these issues and questions. Further, while my research was hardly exhaustive, it suggests that the case law won’t provide quick and easy answers either. With the rulemaking barreling towards completion with an M&I provision on board, stakeholders who may be concerned about these issues should consider (1) submitting comments to the FTC asking for clarification in the final rule and/or (2) requesting an informal hearing to address these questions. (See here for more information.)

We will also be watching carefully to see whether the FTC includes similar means and instrumentalities provisions in the many other rules it is developing.

The FTC’s Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) seeking comment on a potential rule prohibiting “junk fees” and related practices hit the Federal Register yesterday.  The rule has the potential to fundamentally alter how fees are disclosed in advertising and across the customer experience in nearly every industry that charges some type of fee.  Interested parties now have until January 9 to provide comments and feedback on the proposal.  The ANPR’s publication follows a series of meetings and announcements by the FTC, CFPB, and President Biden that the administration was taking actions to prohibit so-called “junk fees” that “can weaken market competition, raise costs for consumers and businesses, and hit the most vulnerable Americans the hardest.”

Prohibiting junk fees may sound uncontroversial in the abstract, but what does it mean in practice?  We concentrate here on the FTC’s ANPR given its potential breadth and impact on a host of industries including travel, delivery services and others in the gig economy, restaurants, and e-commerce sites.

What is a “Junk Fee”?

The ANPR uses the term “junk fees” to refer to “unfair or deceptive fees that are charged for goods or services that have little or no added value to the consumer, including goods or services that consumers would reasonably assume to be included within the overall advertised price.”  According to the FTC, the term includes, but is not limited to “hidden fees,” which are fees disclosed only at a later stage of the customer experience or potentially not at all.

Continue Reading The FTC and CFPB are Coming for “Junk Fees,” but What Does that Really Mean?

On August 11, the FTC finally launched its “commercial surveillance and data security” rulemaking after many months of hype and speculation about the FTC’s ability to address consumer privacy through its “Mag-Moss” rulemaking authority. It did so by releasing (by 3/2 vote) an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) – the first step in a Mag-Moss rulemaking – and holding a press conference featuring Chair Khan, Commissioners Slaughter and Bedoya, and senior FTC staff.

People familiar with the many hurdles in Mag-Moss were watching to see whether the ANPR would be broad and far-reaching (thus guaranteeing a lengthy, complex process) or more narrowly tailored. The answer? The ANPR is remarkably sweeping in scope – covering virtually every form of data collection across the economy, posing 95 questions about factual and legal issues of all kinds, and raising issues that reach beyond the FTC’s legal authority. Indeed, in reading the ANPR, we couldn’t help but wonder whether this is a serious effort to develop a rule or simply a show of activity to address over-hyped expectations. (See more on this topic below.)

Not surprisingly, Commissioners Phillips and Wilson issued strong dissents. Among other things, they raised concerns about agency overreach and the potential to derail the bipartisan privacy bill currently pending in Congress (the ADPPA). Here are more details and takeaways from the FTC’s announcement: Continue Reading The FTC’s Privacy Rulemaking: Broad and Far-Reaching, but Unlikely to Lead to a Rule Anytime Soon

For those not following every detail regarding the progress of the “three corners” federal privacy bill, here’s a summary of where things stand.

In brief, on June 23, the House E&C Consumer Protection Subcommittee held a markup during which it considered a substitute version of the bill (HR 8152), approved it by voice vote, and forwarded it to the full E&C Committee for consideration. The amended bill contains a host of changes, many of which push it in a more business-friendly direction. Senate Commerce Chair Cantwell is more critical of the bill than ever, and has told the media that she won’t take it up in the Senate without substantial improvements. Meanwhile, the FTC, not to be forgotten, released another notice stating that it intends to launch its “commercial surveillance” rule in June 2022. (Yeah, this month.)

That may be all that many of our readers need to know. However, for more details, read on!

The Amended Bill

As noted above, the amended bill contains lots of changes – some small, some big, and some just moving text around.  A few of the changes enhance protections for consumers, but most create more flexibility for businesses. Here are some of the changes that jumped out at us:

  • The amended bill completely revamps its approach to service providers and third parties. Instead of imposing multiple obligations on these entities directly, the bill moves closer to the GDPR-style approach of characterizing these entities as “processors” whose obligations flow primarily from the contracts with, and/or disclosures of, the first parties from whom they receive data. These changes appear in the service provider/third party provisions (§302) and elsewhere, too. For example, each provision in the bill now specifies whether it applies to service providers and/or third parties (most don’t), and the bill now defines “covered entity” as an entity or person that “alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of collecting, processing, or transferring covered data…” §2(9)
  • The new bill provides more leeway to engage in marketing and advertising. Of note, it adds exceptions for first party marketing and targeted advertising to the data minimization provisions (§101(b)(11) & (12)); deletes “online activities” from the sensitive data category (§2(24)); and allows the collection and processing of sensitive data, without opt in, to provide a product or service requested by an individual and for a range of other permissible purposes. §102(a)(2) (Transfers still require opt in, subject to limited exceptions. §102(a)(3)). Other provisions remain somewhat confusing in this regard. For example, the bill now excludes first party marketing from the opt out of data transfers (§204(b)(2)) but not targeted advertising. §204(c) Further, even as the bill deletes online activities from the sensitive data category, it now requires opt in for, not just the transfer, but also the collection and processing of aggregated internet search or browsing history. §102(a)(4)
  • The bill also exempts from coverage government agencies and their service providers (§2(9)(C)); broadens the exceptions for small businesses (§209); expands the provisions allowing loyalty programs (§104(b)(2)); and limits the PRA to actual damages (vs. compensatory damages). §403(a)(2) On the other hand, it expands the restrictions on “dark patterns” (§§203(b) & 204(d)); requires the FTC to develop a Unified Opt Out (i.e., no study needed) (§210); authorizes enforcement by not just state AGs, but also other “State Privacy Authorities” (§402); and settles on a “knowledge” standard (in lieu of “actual knowledge”) for determining who is a minor, with some important caveats. §205

The Markup

The markup was fairly quick and uneventful. Members on both sides of the aisle noted their support for the bipartisan effort and stressed that the bill is not the final product. Two Republicans offered amendments – Rep. Lesko to address political bias by the platforms, and Rep. Armstrong to address concerns about the enforcement, preemption, and PRA schemes – but both agreed to withdraw them in the interest of getting the bill to the full Committee. The full Committee could mark up the bill – likely, another substitute amendment – after the House’s July 4th recess.

The Challenges Ahead    

Despite quick action by the Subcommittee, the bill still faces daunting challenges with little time to resolve them. It’s late June in an election year. Some of the issues raised in response to the “discussion draft” haven’t been addressed – including, as Chairman Pallone noted at the hearing, concerns about preemption and the PRA. In addition, the changes in the amended bill create additional questions that will need to be resolved.

Perhaps the darkest cloud over the bill is the lack of support from Senator Cantwell (and her Democratic colleagues Sens. Wyden, Blumenthal, and Schatz, too.). While Cantwell was critical of the “discussion draft,” she has excoriated the revised bill, telling the Washington Post and other news outlets that it has “enforcement loopholes,” that it’s “too weak” to justify preempting state privacy laws, and that Schumer backs her decision not to even bring up the bill in the Senate. (In comments to a reporter last week, her staff also cited concerns about women’s privacy in light of the then-likely, now official, reversal of Roe v. Wade.) Meanwhile, the frustration among the bill’s sponsors is palpable, with Rep. Schakowsky snapping back at Cantwell in the press, and all of the sponsors urging Cantwell to come the table. Without Cantwell’s support, the bill has little or no chance of becoming law.

FTC Privacy Rulemaking Imminent       

Meanwhile, in an updated filing with OMB, the FTC just announced that it will launch its “commercial surveillance” rulemaking this month by issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with a 60-day comment period. As a reminder for our readers, the rulemaking would follow Mag-Moss rulemaking procedures, and would be designed to “curb lax security practices, limit privacy abuses, and ensure that algorithmic decision-making does not result in unlawful discrimination.” Per Mag-Moss procedures, the ANPR will seek public comment but will not yet propose rule text.

If the FTC keeps to this schedule, that means that we will see the ANPR this week. So, for folks who are already whipsawing between privacy developments in California, Colorado, Europe, and Congress (with big news often announced on Friday nights), add this to your late-night reading list. The FTC announcement also confirms that, even if HR 8152 falters, the FTC plans to run with the ball on privacy, perhaps emboldened by the bipartisan efforts and shared concerns that propelled HR 8152 forward.

We’ll continue to track privacy developments at the federal and state level here.

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Join us June 30 for State Attorneys General 102 which answers  a number of questions regarding:

  • Pre-suit/investigation notice requirements for Attorneys General
  • Additional information on the scope of Attorneys General investigative authority and how to challenge an investigation
  • Consumer Complaints: differences among the AGs on handling and use

Register here

Amidst the rising focus on privacy issues affecting children and teens (which we’ve highlighted here, here, here, and here), the FTC just released a new Policy Statement on COPPA, its signature rule protecting the privacy of kids under 13. The Policy Statement, which the FTC unveiled at its May 19 Open Meeting, focuses in particular on COPPA’s application to education technologies used in and by schools to support learning (including remote learning during the pandemic). All five Commissioners voted for the Statement, including newly sworn-in Commissioner Bedoya, and four issued their own written statements. After the meeting, a bipartisan group of Senators, as well as President Biden, released statements praising the FTC’s actions.

While the FTC’s Republican Commissioners questioned whether there was anything really new in the Policy Statement (which was based on longstanding COPPA provisions, as well as FAQs posted on the FTC’s website), all seemed to agree that it elevates the issues highlighted and shows that COPPA is a top FTC priority.

And of course it is! Protecting kids and their data is one privacy issue that most people, regardless of professional or political affiliation, support. Further, under COPPA, the FTC can seek monetary relief (even post-AMG) and conduct rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act, as opposed to under the more cumbersome Mag-Moss process. So it’s not surprising that this issue would be high on the FTC’s agenda during this dynamic and volatile time for privacy.

What does the Policy Statement Say?

The Policy Statement emphasizes that COPPA includes substantive limits on the collection and use of children’s data (not just notice and consent requirements), and says that the FTC intends to fully enforce these provisions, including in school and learning settings where “parents may feel they lack alternatives.”

The Statement focuses in particular on the use of ed tech tools and devices, which have become integral to a range of school activities (especially during the pandemic) but which, per the Statement, raise concerns about data collection, use, and sharing beyond what’s necessary for these activities.

The statement describes COPPA’s substantive limits as follows:

  • Prohibitions Against Mandatory Collection: Covered entities can’t condition participation in an activity on collecting more information from a child than is necessary for that activity. (This prohibition comes right out of the COPPA statute and is echoed in the rule.)
  • Use Prohibitions: Covered entities, including ed tech providers, are “strictly limited” in how they can use data collected from children; for example, ed tech providers that collect kids’ data pursuant to a school’s authorization may use it only for the authorized educational purpose. (This isn’t in the COPPA statute or rule but builds on COPPA guidance and FERPA.)
  • Retention Prohibitions: Covered entities can’t retain personal information from a child longer than reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it was collected. (This isn’t in the COPPA statute, but was added to the rule as part of the 2013 amendments.)
  • Security Requirements: Covered entities must have reasonable procedures to maintain the confidentiality, security, and integrity of kids’ data. (This comes from the COPPA statute, and the FTC expanded these duties in the 2013 amendments. See Section 312.8)

What are some key takeaways? 

  • Kids’ privacy (and advertising) will be a major focus in the coming year. Yeah, this one is obvious, especially since the FTC released the Policy Statement alongside (1) a press release announcing an October 19 workshop on “stealth advertising” directed to children, and (2) proposed updates to the Endorsement Guides, with a new section addressing child-directed endorsements. (The May 23 announcement for Privacy Con also calls for research on privacy risks for kids and teens.) However, it’s worth noting that while the FTC has significant authority to address these issues (under COPPA and the FTC Act), that authority isn’t limitless. By law, COPPA is confined to children under 13, so the FTC can’t use it to address teens – currently a big concern. Further, Congress barred the FTC (long ago) from using its unfairness authority to regulate kids’ advertising. See FTC Act Section 18(h).
  • The provisions highlighted in the Policy Statement aren’t limited to ed tech (for the most part). I say “for the most part” because one of the limits discussed (use limitations) is narrower than the Statement suggests. In particular, the Statement implies that COPPA contains “strict” use limitations that extend to all covered entities. In fact, the COPPA law and rule don’t contain broad use limitations (other than the limits created by notice and consent) – ed tech is a special case, woven together from COPPA guidance and FERPA.
  • Ed tech and other covered entities should assess their compliance now. The FTC is unlikely to be sympathetic to any company caught violating the highlighted provisions. All five Commissioners voted for the Policy Statement; it reiterates longstanding COPPA requirements (mostly – see above); and it has bipartisan support in Congress. Although we may not see the big “crack down” promised in the FTC’s press release (indeed, the FTC has announced a lot of “crack downs” and it has a lot on its plate), the FTC is likely to conduct investigations and bring some cases here.
  • The status of the COPPA regulatory review remains a mystery. A formal review of the COPPA rule has been pending since 2019, and Commissioners Wilson and Philips (among others) queried why the FTC would issue a policy statement instead of completing that review. Where’s the rule? Neither the Policy Statement nor discussions at the Open Meeting answered that question.
  • The announcement provides clues about the FTC’s future plans. Clearly, the FTC is moving forward to impose more substantive limits on business conduct, as Khan has said it would. That’s evident here, as well as in FTC cases requiring, for example, deletion of data and algorithms as a remedy. Khan and her colleagues have also stated that they want to use unfairness more aggressively (for example, to stop “surveillance” and discrimination) – a strategy that could apply to cases and rulemakings across the FTC’s many program areas. In the coming months, we should expect to see stricter conduct limits imposed (or proposed) in multiple contexts, including in the FTC’s anticipated “surveillance” rulemaking.
  • The Commissioners are worried about staff morale. In the face of crushing reports about the steep drop in staff morale at the agency, all of the Commissioners (in their oral and written remarks) thanked staff profusely for their work in developing the Policy Statement and related announcements. (As well they should.)

We’ll keep the news coming on kids and privacy!


Lina Khan’s Privacy Priorities – Time for a RecapRumors suggest that Senator Schumer is maneuvering to confirm Alvaro Bedoya as FTC Commissioner sooner rather than later, which would give FTC Chair Khan the majority she needs to move forward on multiple fronts. One of those fronts is consumer privacy, for which  Khan has announced ambitious plans (discussed here and here) that have stalled for lack of Commissioner votes. With Bedoya potentially on deck, now seems like a good time to recap those plans, as they might provide clues about what’s in the pipeline awaiting Bedoya’s vote. We focus here on three priorities Khan has emphasized in statements and interviews since becoming Chair. Continue Reading Lina Khan’s Privacy Priorities – Time for a Recap